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Abstract
Online services commonly attempt to verify the legiti-
macy of users with CAPTCHAs. However, CAPTCHAs
are annoying for users, often difficult for users to solve,
and can be defeated using cheap labor or, increasingly,
with improved algorithms. We propose a new protocol
for clients to prove their legitimacy, allowing the client’s
devices to vouch for the client. The client’s devices,
and those in close proximity, provide a one-time pass-
code that is verified by the device manufacturer. This
verification proves that the client has physical access to
expensive and trusted devices, vouching for the client’s
legitimacy.
1 Introduction and Background
Many online services provide functionality that is
intended for use by humans, but can be abused for profit
by automated robots. For instance, robots can sign up
for free email accounts (GMail, Yahoo! Mail, etc.) and
send spam. Service providers would like to prevent
automated bots from signing up for these services, and
ensure that only a real human can sign up. Prevention of
automated crawling and brute-force password guessing
attempts is also desired.
Currently, CAPTCHAs are used to attempt to dif-
ferentiate between humans and automated bots. A
CAPTCHA is a puzzle presented to users that is believed
to be easy for a human to solve, but very difficult for
a computer to algorithmically solve. The user must
correctly solve the puzzle to prove to the service that
they are a human. The most common CAPTCHAs used
today are images containing distorted text that users
must transcribe. However, with improvements in OCR
(optical character recognition) algorithms, these puzzles
have become easier for computers to solve algorith-
mically. Additionally, adding more distortion to the
images to counteract the OCR improvements have made
many CAPTCHA puzzles very difficult for humans to
solve. These CAPTCHA puzzles also have large acces-
sibility problems (for users with vision impairment, etc.).
However, all puzzle-based CAPTCHAs have a funda-
mental problem: even if a perfect puzzle can be created
one that can be consistently easily solved by humans, but
can never be algorithmically solved by a bot attackers
can still hire humans to solve the puzzles for them. APIs
have been developed that use third-world labor in order
to do this for fractions of a penny a piece1. If the value
that can be gained by the attacker (and lost by the service
provider) is of any significance, the CAPTCHA is fairly
useless.
We propose Trustware: a novel method of verifying
legitimate clients. Trustware is not a CAPTCHA,
but instead is built off of the observation that when a
legitimate user is signing up for a service, (s)he is likely
doing so from a variety of different electronic devices: a
laptop or desktop computer, a smartphone, a tablet, etc.
All of these devices are expensive pieces of hardware,
likely costing at least $100. Increasingly, users are also
likely to be in close proximity to a number of Internet of
Things sensor devices like FitBits or smart watches.
When an online service requests that a client proves
their legitimacy using Trustware, the client gathers one-
time password tokens from nearby devices. The one-time
password tokens are generated using a secret placed on
each device by the device’s manufacturer. This allows
the manufacturer to verify that the device is in the pres-
ence of the client, and confirm as much to the online ser-
vice.
1https://2captcha.com/
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2 Related Work
CAPTCHAs [5] first became popular in the early
2000’s as a security mechanism against malicious
automated robots. In the years since, both algorithms
to defeat CAPTCHAs and CAPTCHAs themselves
have developed. ReCAPTCHA [6], developed in 2008,
uses scanned words that OCR algorithms are unable to
decipher as CAPTCHAS puzzles.
Google’s latest attempt at CAPTCHA, NoCAPTCHA
[4], is of particular interest. NoCAPTCHA uses infor-
mation Google has collected on users through its array
of services in addition to a traditional CAPTCHA to
determine if a user is legitimate. If enough information
is present on the client, the CAPTCHA puzzle may
even be skipped. However, this approach requires a
large amount of data available on users, which is of-
ten not practical, and comes with many privacy concerns.
Prior work has also been done to verify a client’s pos-
session of devices. Two-factor authentication keys use
this principle. When a two-factor key is manufactured,
a secret is implanted into it, and one-time passwords are
generated from it, for confirmation from an online ser-
vice. In particular, U2F2 aims to create a standardized
protocol for verification of a client’s possession of a key-
chain device. However, these approaches focus on con-
firming the identify of a specific user, not on simply de-
ciding whether a client has legitimate intentions.
3 Architecture
We have designed a communication protocol that satis-
fies the goals set out for the project while maintaining
as much user privacy and convenience as possible. Fur-
thermore, our protocol ensures that various attacks and
exploitations are not viable. We first give an overview
of the components that make the protocol possible, then
step through our proposed protocol, and finally, describe
a practical implementation of the protocol.
3.1 System Components
There are four prerequisites to be set up for Trustware
authentication: the device manufacturer authentication
server, hardware and software support on client-side
devices, website-side Trustware software, and client
browser support.
For a particular brand of electronic device to be sup-
ported by Trustware, the company that manufacturers
2https://www.yubico.com/applications/fido/
the device must run an authentication server in order
to authenticate its own devices. This is a simple web
service that tracks produced devices and associated
Trustware information. When a device is manufactured,
it is assigned a unique ID and secret key. The server
maintains a database of each device ID, secret, and usage
information. The server responds to device-trust requests
from clients and allows the company to register new
devices as they are manufactured. Devices must also run
software that can communicate with the client-side web
browser. This will vary depending on the nature of the
device; exact protocol specifications are described in the
next section.
Each device will be manufactured with three
hard-coded values: ID, secret key, and company authen-
tication server URL. Unique IDs are randomly assigned
by the company that manufactures the device, as is the
base32-encoded 16-character secret key. These two
values are ideally as difficult as possible to extract or
alter on a device. The device will also contain the URL
of the authentication server run by the manufacturer.
In order for a website to verify legitimate users via
Trustware, it must embed Trustware code in its verifica-
tion process. When a user clicks ”Submit” (or whatever
action needs to be verified), the embedded coordinates
with the client’s web browser to verify the legitimacy of
the client. The software then returns whether or not it
believes the client is a legitimate user.
In order to coordinate communications between
devices, manufacturers, and the web service, the client
must be using a web browser that supports Trustware.
The browser detects Trustware-enabled websites, then
communicates with the client’s devices and associated
manufacturers to send authenticated trust levels to the
web service.
3.2 Protocol
We begin when a webpage requires verification that
users are legitimate users. This could be a multitude of
reasons: email sign-up, auction bidding, forum posting,
etc. A Trustware-enabled client visits the website, and
it generates a new session token for the client. This
session token is stored in the HTML of the webpage
in order to communicate it to the client (Figure 1, step
1). The client’s web browser detects that the webpage
is Trustware-enabled, grabs the token, and begins
harvesting nearby device information.
Trustware devices near the client’s computer broad-
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Figure 1: Trustware Protocol
cast three identifying pieces of information: the device
ID, a time-based one-time-password (TOTP), and the
URL of the device manufacturer authentication server.
The TOTP is calculated using standard TOTP practices:
the current 30-second time interval since Unix epoch
is combined with the device’s secret key using HMAC
to generate a token that is only valid at the time it was
generated, within 30 seconds [3]. Upon receiving a
device information tuple, the web browser makes a
HTTPS request with the device ID, TOTP, and client
session token to the device manufacturer URL in order
to authenticate (Figure 1, steps 2 and 3).
The device manufacturer authentication server re-
ceives the request. It retrieves the secret key for the
given device ID from its device database, and computes
the TOTP for the current 30-second interval. If the
given TOTP and computed TOTP match (or it matches
an adjacent interval’s TOTP code, accounting for clock
skew), the request has been verified as legitimate and
the process continues. The server then takes the device
authentication history and calculates the relative amount
of trust for the device. This heuristic can vary by man-
ufacturer, but in general, it has the desirable property
that devices with usage behavior similar to automated
bot systems are given low trust, whereas devices with
human-like usage behavior are given high trust. As an
example, if requests have been made to authenticate a
device multiple times in the span of a few seconds, these
requests are most likely coming from an automated bot
and low trust should be given. After calculating device
trust, and server responds to the client request with the
client session token, device trust, and current time, all
signed with the private key of the manufacturer (Figure
1, step 4).
Manufacturer responses will steadily come in to the
client, which are then forwarded to the requesting web-
page (Figure 1, step 5). Each response is a tuple indi-
cating that the manufacturer vouches (or doesn’t) for the
trust of a given device in the client’s vicinity. When the
webpage receives a device trust tuple, it checks that it is
coming from a verified manufacturer. The webpage has
a list of Trustware-verified manufacturers and associated
public keys, and verifies the tuple using this information.
Incorrectly-signed tuples or unverified manufacturers are
rejected. The enclosed device trust is then added to the
overall trust level for the client’s session. If the trust level
reaches some predetermined value (chosen by the web-
page), the client is deemed legitimate and allowed ac-
cess to whatever resource the webpage offers. Should
the client fail to provide enough verified device trust to
satisfy the webpage within some predetermined length
of time (chosen by the webpage), the client is assumed
to be illegitimate and subsequently rejected.
3.3 Implementation
We have implemented an example Trustware system in
order to illustrate the protocol. The client can visit our
Trustware-enabled webpage, gather device information
from an Android phone and Linux desktop, verify these
devices with a mock manufacturer server, then relay trust
information to the webpage and gain access. There are
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several important differences between our implementa-
tion and proposed protocol:
• Device IDs and secrets are stored on the software
level, rather than the hardware level
• A web browser plugin facilitates communications,
rather than the web browser having the functionality
built in
• Manufacturer trust responses are sent directly to the
requesting webpage, rather than relayed through the
client (compare steps 4 and 5 in Figure 1 vs 2)
• Device trust is calculated using a simple rate-
limiting heuristic, rather than a more intelligent
measure
All of the components described below can be found
online at https://github.com/trustware. Each component
has installation and usage instructions, making it possi-
ble to set up and use the entire Trustware system.
Android phone: We have developed an Android appli-
cation that uses Bluetooth LE to advertise its presence to
Trustware. The application sends advertisement packets
containing the device ID, current TOTP, and manufac-
turer URL. As previously noted, the device ID is stored
on a software level as a compile-time constant. Our web
browser plugin, below, listens for these packets when
searching for nearby Trustware devices. The Android
phone must have software and hardware support for
Bluetooth LE; we tested the application on a Samsung
Galaxy S5 running Android 5.0.
Linux driver: This driver runs on a desktop Linux
system in order to advertise its presence to Trustware.
It advertises the same device tuple as the Android
phone, and similarly has a software-level device ID.
Advertisement information can be read by the web
browser plugin, below, via /dev/otp. The driver was
installed on Ubuntu 14.04 and set to run at start-up.
Web service: We created a dummy webpage that
requires Trustware authentication. The webpage allows
users to create an account on an imaginary service,
such as an email provider. It communicates with the
client as specified in the Trustware protocol, but as
previously noted, is sent device trust information by the
manufacturer directly rather than by through the client.
If the webpage is not sent sufficient device trust within
a few seconds, it rejects the client’s request. We wrote a
simple script in Javascript that website developers can
easily embed in their own webpages.
Google Chrome extension: Rather than modifying
a web browser, we elected to write a plugin to carry
out the Trustware protocol. We wrote an extension for
Google Chrome that watches for Trustware requests
from webpages, then relays device trust information
to the corresponding manufacturer servers. It scans
the HTML of visited webpages for a custom attribute
tag that identifies Trustware and contains the session
token. If a webpage requested Trustware verification,
the plugin scans Bluetooth LE advertisement packets
(Android phone) and /dev/otp (Linux driver) for device
information. Device tuples are then sent to the mock
manufacturer server in order to be verified.
Mock manufacturer: We set up a manufacturer authen-
tication server to serve the aforementioned Trustware
devices. The server maintains a database of device ID,
secret, and use count tuples. When an authentication
request is received, the server follows the Trustware
protocol in order to verify the device. Device trust
is calculated as an inverse of the number of uses and
rate-limited; i.e., device trust decreases as the number of
authentication requests increases, and a device cannot
authentication twice in ten seconds. This is a simplistic
trust heuristic simply for demonstration purposes, and
is improper for actual deployment. After calculating
device trust, a signed tuple of session token and device
trust is sent to the web service.
4 Evaluation
Trustware aims to move the necessary verification work
from the client’s perspective to browser, online service
providers, and device manufacturers. In our evaluation
we consider the adoption cost for each stakeholder: end
users, web browsers, online services, and device manu-
facturers. We also discuss the usefulness as well as limi-
tations of our protocol in practice.
4.1 Costs
User: Users must be surrounded by or use machines
that have Trustware support to use Trustware verified
services. Each message sent and received in the Trust-
ware protocol involves <1 KB of data, clearly within
the constraints of a single network packet for each
trip made. A client is required to establish additional
sessions with a manufacturer service. More implicitly is
the cost for total user privacy. Because the online service
must verify trust vouches using a specific manufacturer’s
public key, the manufacturers, or device brands, that
surround a user are announced to the online service in
use.
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Figure 2: Implementation
Browser: A compatible web browser is required to
retrieve (TOTP, ID, Manufacturer) tuples on Trustware
form submissions through the device in use as well as in
range Trustware Bluetooth LE advertisement packets.
Web Service: A web service that wishes to integrate
Trustware verification must make frontend and backend
modifications to their site. The complexity of this
completely rides on ease of its framework. Though
we’ve implemented such a framework, one as robust and
finalized as Google’s CAPTCHA service would be ideal
for adoption.
Manufacturer: Each manufacturer will have many
responsibilities. First, a secret Trustware key needs to
be added into devices at manufacturing time (ideally
implanted in hard to extract Trusted Platform Modules).
Second, they must store and accept requests for such
OTP being sent for that particular device ID.
4.2 Value Added
Once the Trustware automated pipeline is set up, verify-
ing client legitimacy can be done without manual work
from any participant while providing the benefits of
CAPTCHA. An automated legitimacy checking process
is also faster than an average CAPTCHA solver [1].
4.3 Limitations
The goals of the Trustware protocol force some limit on
what it is meant to accomplish. To reiterate, Trustware
does not prove that someone is human. It’s merely
a reputation based rate limiting tool that is apathetic
toward someone’s true identity.
Because of no client-side checks, Trustware also
cannot defend against a compromised machines. For
instance, a bot net could exploit a user’s device and
the device’s surrounding them for trust. Trustware
is also currently susceptible to what we’ve deemed
”trust-eating” and ”trust-mining”. Imagine an adversary
that has set up in a location surrounded by many Trust-
ware broadcasting devices. By collecting surrounding
device’s tuples (OTP, ID, manufacturer) and requesting
verification from the manufacturer over and over (though
limited by the manufacturer service’s timeout ”recharge”
for that device), this adversary could use the collected
trust for services or just throw it away, unnecessarily
tampering with other’s reputations. More impressively,
adversaries could collude in their efforts collecting trust
for prespecified tokens outside their vicinity. A trust
mining business or API could even be created to collect
trust to assign to a given session token. This attack’s
efforts are however limited to a small timeframe (on our
current recommended trust heuristic 30 seconds). Stock-
piled trust would effectively expire and is only valid for
a specific token. We’ve concluded ”trust-mining” attacks
cost more than remote CAPTCHA solvers because these
devices are more costly puzzle solvers.
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Due to the device reputation based system, shared
resources, such as a library or university computing
center, is also arguably bound not to have trust values
that reflect the fact that it is shared. However, these
shared devices arguably have trust levels that are reflect
their use.
Lastly, because of Trustware’s vicinity requirement,
users who remotely access a machine not within Blue-
tooth range also will not have adequately reflected trust.
One possible remedy is to remotely transmit trust to said
machine, similar to our ”trust-mining” attack effort.
5 Future Work
We have demonstrated a proof-of-concept implementa-
tion of the Trustware protocol. In addition to fine-tuning
the trust heuristic and timeout period to defend against
mining, future work includes securing the participation
of hardware device manufacturers and increasing the pri-
vacy awareness of the implementations.
5.1 Manufacturer Participation
The participation of the device manufacturers is a crucial
for the success of the protocol. In order for Trustware
to function it was assumed manufacturers had an API to
respond with trust levels for a given device ID. In reality
this requires hardware companies to pay for a dedicated
server, as well as to securely encode the device’s secrets
and API endpoint URLs at manufacture time. Although
such costs are negligible a reasonable question to ask
is why a hardware manufacturer would be willing bear
them to support Trustware.
Many large players in the device production industry
also have a vested interest in trying to solve the problem
of verifying legitimate clients. One such example is
Google, which is not necessarily a traditional hardware
manufacturer, but has a wide variety of online services
for which they only want legitimate clients to be able
to use. If a large player like Google starting using the
protocol as a standard they could use their leverage
over the Android ecosystem to compel many device
manufacturers to follow suit.
Google demonstrated their desire to tackle this prob-
lem by releasing their own solution in ”No CAPTCHA
reCAPTCHA” which utilizes the vast amount of data
they have on individual clients to determine their legit-
imacy [4]. However a problem with Google solution
is many developers don’t want to provide Google with
more data for privacy and competitive reasons so they
may be reluctant to opt-in and instead continue to offload
the work of proving client legitimacy to their users.
Both issues of preventing tedious work for the user and
respecting their privacy could be addressed through
adopting Trustware.
Alternatively, a more ambitious line of exploratory
work could be the use of a carefully designed decentral-
ized ”trust token” on the Ethereum [7] network to take
the place of a manufacturer server.
5.2 Privacy Improvements
User privacy is promisingly becoming a more important
consideration. Making the manufacturer blind to what
services are using the protocol was one way to increase
privacy awareness. We also propose using rotating
device IDs in the manufacturer’s implementation.
Users would likely be hesitant to supply a static
unique ID as currently implemented, as it provides an
easy way of tracking their activity. Fortunately, the
specifications for Bluetooth Low Energy [2] are very
privacy minded and allow for developers to use rotating
IDs to frequently change the private addresses of devices
to avoid such tracking.
This increased privacy awareness and the decentral-
ized nature of the Trustware protocol will hopefully
make it a more compelling alternative to current no-
CAPTCHA methods for verifying client legitimacy.
The entire Trustware protocol has a realm of other pos-
sible use cases, one of which is a reputation based crowd
sourcing for things such as location and other spoof-able
things. We believe there is more interesting work to be
done here.
6 Conclusion
Trustware provides a unique verification system that ap-
proves legitimate clients while rejecting malicious ones.
Work still needs to be done developing a powerful stan-
dard for trust heuristic and the trade-off between absolute
convenience and privacy/protection. Yet, we still believe
that there is an incentive for someone in the online ser-
vices and hardware space (Google, Apple, etc.) to take
notice. With the increasing prevalence of devices using
Bluetooth LE in the near future that Trustware can pig-
gyback on, this is well within the realm of possibility.
References
[1] BURSZTEIN, E., BETHARD, S., FABRY, C., MITCHELL, J. C.,
AND JURAFSKY, D. How good are humans at solving captchas? a
6
large scale evaluation. In 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy.
[2] GOMEZ, C., OLLER, J., AND PARADELLS, J. Overview and eval-
uation of bluetooth low energy: An emerging low-power wireless
technology. Sensors 12, 9 (2012), 734–753.
[3] M’RAIHI, D., MACHANI, S., PEI, M., AND RYDELL, J. Totp:
Time-based one-time password algorithm. Tech. rep., 2011.
[4] SHET, V. Are you a robot? Introducing No CAPTCHA re-
CAPTCHA. Google Online Security Blog (Dec. 2014).
[5] VON AHN, L., BLUM, M., HOPPER, N., AND LANGFORD, J.
Captcha: Using hard ai problems for security. In Proceedings
of the 22Nd International Conference on Theory and Applications
of Cryptographic Techniques (Berlin, Heidelberg, 2003), EURO-
CRYPT’03, Springer-Verlag, pp. 294–311.
[6] VON AHN, L., MAURER, B., MCMILLEN, C., ABRAHAM, D.,
AND BLUM, M. recaptcha: Human-based character recognition
via web security measures. Science 321, 5895 (2008), 1465–1468.
[7] WOOD, G. Ethereum: A secure decentralised generalised transac-
tion ledger. Ethereum Project Yellow Paper 151 (2014).
7
